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Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), in which the Council requested that it be kept regularly informed of progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, respect for the ceasefire and implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The report also provides an assessment of the overall situation in the country since my previous progress report to the Council, dated 25 January 2007 (S/2007/42).

II. Implementation of the major elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

2. During the period under review, the parties continued to make some, albeit limited, progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including welcome steps towards the redeployment of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) from Southern Sudan. However several key issues, including the status of Abyei and the management of other armed groups, remained unresolved. There are increasing concerns about the timeline for elections scheduled for 2009, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the demarcation of the 1 January 1956 border, which remain well behind schedule.

Security aspects

3. At the same time, the security situation in the UNMIS area of operations remained generally stable. The town of Malakal, which was the scene of heavy fighting in November 2006, has been calm but tense. In parts of Upper Nile State and the transitional areas there were several civil disturbances, related mainly to the non-payment of public sector salaries. Looting and ambushes perpetrated by rogue elements continued along arterial roads around Juba. On 26 January 2007, a United Nations peacekeeper was killed in an attack on a humanitarian demining team near Magwit, Eastern Equatoria. Elsewhere in Equatoria, reported activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in March continued to undermine security.

4. Redeployment of the parties' armed forces is at a critical stage. Recently, SAF made visible progress in withdrawing from Southern Sudan, moving troops out of the conflict-prone district of Phom al-Zeraf in Upper Nile State and redeploying an

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air defence unit out of the Malakal area. However, to meet the 9 July deadline for their departure from Southern Sudan, SAF still has to complete its redeployment from Malakal and other important locations, including the oil-rich Bentiu area, where it has retained a concentration of forces. Meanwhile, the redeployment of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States has yet to begin.

5. While both parties have asserted their commitment to meeting the redeployment timelines set out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the process is under pressure because of lengthy delays in implementing other security arrangements specified in the Agreement. According to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, redeployment targets may be met through the actual movement of forces, the transfer of troops into Joint Integrated Units or demobilization. According to those criteria, SAF has now redeployed 71 per cent of its forces; however, SPLA remains seriously concerned about the number of forces remaining in Southern Sudan, including former militia members now assigned to Joint Integrated Units. SPLA also questions the status of some 7,747 "voluntarily demobilized" soldiers, who continue to receive SAF salaries pending absorption into the much-delayed demobilization and reintegration programme.

6. Although there has been progress in the formation of Joint Integrated Units, delays in this area continue to undermine the fulfilment of the security protocol. SPLA redeployment is contingent upon the establishment of Joint Integrated Units, which so far have reached 77 per cent of their total projected strength, with 30,112 troops assigned out of the anticipated 39,000. In some areas, the two components of the Joint Integrated Units are co-located and have established good working relations, but in others, designated forces remain in their assembly areas some distance from the planned sites. Progress in this area has been especially slow in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, owing partly to the severe logistical problems of SPLA. Overall, SPLA remains suspicious of SAF military intelligence activity within the units, while SAF argues that SPLA should accelerate its own redeployment to keep pace with the formation of Joint Integrated Units.

7. In a significant development, in February the parties agreed on a common military doctrine and code of conduct for the Joint Integrated Units, which the joint operational headquarters in Juba will now translate into practical activity. This offers some hope for the much-needed integration of the units, which to date have remained functionally divided, with each side retaining its own administration and command and control mechanisms.

8. In a related issue, the integration of other armed groups aligned with the parties also remains problematic. A number of groups formerly aligned with SAF have shifted their allegiance to SPLA and remain in Southern Sudan, while others have been absorbed into the SAF component of the Joint Integrated Units. Many are expected to undergo disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the planning for which is progressing slowly. To overcome distrust, the parties must develop a joint strategy for managing other armed groups and for allowing the transparent verification of their numbers, which has so far proved challenging.

9. In sector 6 of UNMIS operations (which includes the disputed area of Abyei), the reporting period saw renewed shifts of allegiance among non-incorporated armed groups in Meiram and Debab. The overall heavy military presence in this area remains a source of concern, particularly as both parties reimposed restrictions

on UNMIS movements on 28 February, affecting the Mission's monitoring and verification ability.

10. At the same time, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee has worked effectively to tackle the security issues in its regular meetings. Meanwhile, the Ceasefire Political Commission met on 25 January for the first time since early November 2006 and agreed to hold a special session on security problems, including those related to other armed groups, redeployments and Joint Integrated Units. This meeting was held on 5 March; however the agenda item on Joint Integrated Units has twice been postponed. Overall, there remains a need for high-level political engagement to advance the security agenda.

Political aspects

11. While political parties are beginning to focus on preparations for the midterm elections, envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to take place in 2009, development of the legislative framework and other prerequisites for the vote are well behind schedule. The National Constitutional Review Commission is now preparing for consultations on a draft elections law. Planning for the national census, which will determine the drawing of constituency boundaries, remains mired in budget difficulties. The pilot census project is now due to be completed by the end of April.

12. The most important piece of legislation passed during the reporting period was the Political Parties Act, which regulates the registration, operations and dissolution of political parties. The National Constitutional Review Commission held wide-ranging consultations with opposition parties and civil society, but the opposition National Democratic Alliance walked out of final discussion in protest of a clause allowing for the dissolution of political parties. The National Congress Party then introduced an amendment adding further requirements for party registration, and the bill was passed in the absence of the National Democratic Alliance. Opposition parties continued to voice concerns about the commitment of both Comprehensive Peace Agreement partners to a free and fair environment for elections.

13. The period under review witnessed some progress in the establishment of other CPA institutions. The National Civil Service Act and the National Civil Service Commission Act were enacted, and members of the Commission for the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital were appointed by presidential decree. At the same time, some key CPA-related legislation has yet to be put before the legislature, in particular the new National Security Act and the National Police Act. Meanwhile, the technical border committee expects to present its final report to the Presidency by October.

14. Meanwhile, the parties continue to reiterate their commitment to their partnership. On 25 March, the National Congress Party/SPLM Joint High Political Committee established a subcommittee to prepare a strategy for their partnership and to tackle contentious issues including Abyei, the performance of certain Comprehensive Peace Agreement commissions and the integration of other armed groups. Meanwhile, the SPLM Interim National Council met in Yei from 8 to 12 February, for the first time since the death of First Vice-President John Garang, in July 2005, and reasserted its commitment to make unity attractive. SPLM also decided to relocate its national headquarters from Juba to Khartoum, as part of a plan to revitalize its national and international network of offices.

15. At the Government of Southern Sudan level, President Salva Kiir continued to appoint and reassign personnel in the Government of Southern Sudan and southern state governments, which are now established but facing serious capacity constraints. A lack of qualified personnel continues to hinder the development of the judiciary in particular.

16. President Kiir also launched a major anti-corruption campaign. A number of senior officials, including the Minister of Finance, were relieved of their posts to answer charges of embezzlement and bribery, including the alleged embezzlement of $60 million transferred to the SPLM by the National Congress Party shortly after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

17. In both Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, newly established government structures gained some traction. Southern Kordofan State appointed a new constitutional Government on 27 February, replacing a caretaker administration. The terms of the incumbent governors in both States are likely to be extended until 1 July. While the two states have recently made some gains in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, SPLM-controlled areas within them remain administratively separate, with their own educational and police systems, in contravention of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

18. In Abyei, the absence of a civilian administration continued to complicate the search for durable peace. The Abyei Development Committee, a civil society group, which took control of a former civilian administration office on 14 January, continued its ad hoc operations despite its lack of legal status. The visit of President Omer al-Bashir to Southern Kordofan State and to Misseriya areas of sector 6 in early March and to Blue Nile State later in the month raised hopes of progress in developing those marginalized regions.

Wealth-sharing aspects

19. At the second Sudan Consortium meeting, held from 19 to 21 March, both the Government of Southern Sudan and the Government of National Unity gave an optimistic account of progress achieved in implementing the wealth-sharing provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In reality, however, there has been little movement since the previous reporting period. While the joint technical committee on oil meets regularly to calculate oil revenues and shares, the lack of transparency continues to create mistrust, with both the Government of Southern Sudan and oil-producing states maintaining that they are not receiving their full entitlements. Meanwhile the National Petroleum Commission has not met in full session since 2005. Concerns remain about the severe impact of oil exploration on the population, including environmental degradation and lack of compensation for the displaced.

20. The Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission also continued to face challenges in fulfilling its mandate to ensure the prompt and transparent allocation and transfer of funds to the lower levels of Government. Without strong political support, the Commission has found it difficult to generate change in the existing mechanisms for allocating resources, including the states' support fund, which should have been dissolved after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

III. Implementation of other peace processes in the Sudan

21. Implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, signed in October 2006, has stagnated, owing largely to internal power struggles within the leadership of the Eastern Front. A split among Beja factions of the Front prevented it from presenting a list of nominees for the posts allocated to it under the Agreement. The Eastern Front leadership has now requested mediation by the Government of Eritrea to help resolve the abiding conflict among the Beja factions. For its part, the Sudanese Government continued to express optimism about the implementation of the Agreement and has begun preparations for the disarmament and integration of former Eastern Front combatants.

22. Peace talks between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army remained suspended, with the latter rejecting the mediation of the Government of Southern Sudan and saying it did not feel secure enough to resume talks in Juba. Meanwhile, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the two sides expired on 28 February. My Special Envoy for the LRA-affected Areas, Joaquim Chissano, played an active role in the efforts aimed at restarting the talks, meeting with key stakeholders during his visit to the region in February and March. Talks are now expected to resume in April with an expanded mediation team, including observers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania.

23. In January UNMIS began transferring personnel and equipment to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) under the "light support package" of assistance. As at 10 April, 37 military staff officers had been deployed (of 105 foreseen in the Agreement), as had 32 police advisers (of 33) and 23 civilian staff (of 48 projected). With the exception of medical and public information equipment and armoured personnel carriers, the logistical and material support provided for in the package was handed over on 11 January. The deployment of an additional 19 military and 19 civilian personnel who have been identified and recruited is pending the construction of office facilities and living accommodations that are compliant with United Nations safety and security standards in Darfur. This is a very serious issue, which UNMIS is currently attempting to address. There is also an outstanding requirement for contributions from Member States of 44 staff officers and 36 armoured personnel carriers. The tripartite committee continued to meet to facilitate the implementation of the package. The major barrier to the full implementation of the light support package, however, remains the lack of security in the face of inadequate infrastructure in Darfur.

24. The African Union and the United Nations completed consultations on the "heavy support package" of assistance on 21 January, and a joint report was transmitted to the Government of the Sudan on 24 January. The response on 6 March from President Al-Bashir challenged key provisions of the heavy support package. Details regarding the package, as agreed upon by the African Union and the United Nations, were communicated to the Government of the Sudan by the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission in identical letters addressed to President Al-Bashir on 24 January. In his response, dated 6 March, President Al-Bashir accepted some aspects of the package and expressed reservations with regard to others, in particular as they related to the Darfur Peace Agreement, and he proposed further discussions to address them. As agreed during the mini-summit on Darfur held in Riyadh on 28 March, a technical

consultative briefing was held by the United Nations and the African Union with the Government of the Sudan in Addis Ababa on 9 April in order to reiterate the rationale behind joint African Union/United Nations plans with regard to command and control, force generation, funding and other contentious issues and to finalize agreement on the heavy support package. The agreement on the heavy support package for AMIS was finalized at the meeting, with the exception of tactical/armed helicopters. Subsequent to a 12 April Security Council briefing on the outcome of the Addis Ababa meeting, the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations, in a note verbale to the Secretary-General dated 16 April, confirmed the Government's approval of the helicopter component of the heavy support package. Following Security Council authorization of the deployment of the heavy support package, appropriate steps will be taken to seek the commitment authority required to cover its cost, which is estimated to be $287.9 million.

25. With regard to the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation, the agreed terms of reference for the joint special representative and a framework containing agreed principles for taking forward the preparations for the hybrid operation were communicated to President Al-Bashir in identical letters sent by the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union on 6 March. From 19 to 26 March, in Addis Ababa, African Union and United Nations multidisciplinary teams conducted joint planning for the hybrid operation in Darfur. The draft report is being reviewed by the United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission with a view to its being shared with the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council respectively.

IV. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan

Political support and reconciliation

26. Both at the level of the central Government and in the regions, UNMIS continued to provide good offices and mediation in support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In Abyei, Mission staff worked actively and in close collaboration with local authorities and Misseriya community leaders to defuse persistent tension. In Malakal, UNMIS continued to engage all parties in support of the peaceful relocation of SAF and aligned groups from Phom al-Zeraf. Meanwhile, in Southern Kordofan, UNMIS, together with other United Nations agencies, actively supported local authorities in their efforts to reduce tension after clashes between local police and student demonstrators in Kadugli in February.

27. In Southern Sudan, UNMIS continued its work in support of efforts by local authorities to promote peace and reconciliation. In February, the Southern Sudan Peace Commission held a conference of governors and commissioners in Torit, Greater Equatoria, which was the first major region-wide peace conference. This event, held in collaboration with Pact Sudan, an international non-governmental organization, and in consultation with UNMIS, brought to light a number of local government concerns with the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and laid important groundwork for further peace and reconciliation initiatives.

28. Simultaneously, UNMIS stepped up its engagement in efforts to reinvigorate the political process in Darfur in line with decisions taken at high-level consultations on Darfur held in Addis Ababa on 16 November 2006 and later confirmed by both the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. My Special Envoy for Darfur, Jan Eliasson, and the African Union Special Envoy, Salim Ahmed Salim, conducted two joint missions to the Sudan, meeting with all major stakeholders from the Government, opposition parties and rebel groups. Based on their contacts with key stakeholders, the Special Envoys are now developing a road map for the peace process in order to address the outstanding concerns raised by the non-signatories. UNMIS provided significant logistical and substantive support to the Envoys, as well as dedicated staff to the Joint Mediation Support Team.

Military deployment and activities

29. During the period under review, the UNMIS military component intensified its monitoring and verification activities in support of the ongoing redeployment process. In March the Mission's Force Commander convened special sessions of the Ceasefire Joint Military Commission to address discrepancies in data provided by the parties on the formation of Joint Integrated Units and the alignment of other armed groups. UNMIS military personnel subsequently undertook an intensive verification of the composition and strength of the Joint Integrated Units.

30. As SAF forces continued to withdraw from Upper Nile State, UNMIS military personnel also played a significant role in fostering dialogue between military commanders and supervising confidence-building measures, particularly in Phom al-Zeraf. Tension in the area had eased noticeably by the end of the reporting period, following the successful redeployment of SAF forces and the incorporation of erstwhile other armed groups into the Joint Integrated Unit in Malakal.

31. The military component of UNMIS was active in undertaking civil-military cooperation tasks in local communities, including the provision of medical staff to clinics, the construction and grading of roads and the clearance of unexploded ordnance across all sectors. In a tragic incident on 26 January (see para. 3 above), an Indian peacekeeper was killed in a roadside ambush by unidentified attackers while providing protection to civilian demining contractors. While it appears that there is no regular threat in the area, the United Nations troops with armoured personnel carriers have since been redeployed to the area in order to increase security during demining operations.

32. Further progress was also made towards establishing new team sites in areas where a greater UNMIS presence is required. In this connection, suitable land was identified at Raga (Western Bahr Al Ghazal) and Baw (Blue Nile), and planning is under way to convert temporary team sites at Talodi and Jullud (Southern Kordofan) into permanent sites. Land has also been acquired in Al Fasher to accommodate staff officers associated with the light support package.

33. As at 10 April, 96.4 per cent of mandated UNMIS military personnel (9,363 out of a total of 9,706) had been deployed, including 595 United Nations military observers, 253 staff officers and 8,515 troops, in addition to 63 staff officers designated for deployment to AMIS under the light support package.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

34. UNMIS, together with other United Nations agencies, continued to support the preregistration of 60,000 SAF soldiers nominated for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in both the north and the south. Meanwhile, SPLA has identified 30,700 "non-essential" combatants to be preregistered for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. UNMIS and its partners are already providing technical support to the northern and southern commissions responsible for planning disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes. However, the wider process remains hampered by a lack of meaningful engagement on the part of the parties in the principal disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mechanisms established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

35. Coordination between the southern and northern disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commissions and the provision of direction to those bodies remain a major obstacle. The National Council for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination, which is responsible for oversight, coordination and evaluation of the progress of the two commissions, had only its second meeting in March 2007, and it has made limited progress on strategic planning issues. This delay has hampered the functioning of the commissions, which, despite support from UNMIS and other international partners, have yet to clarify the eligibility criteria and entitlements for the target groups.

36. Those factors have contributed to a disconnect in planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the process of SPLA transformation, as well as to problems with the demobilization of SAF-related militias in the south. More support, including international engagement with the National Council, will be required for the commissions to effectively implement their mandate.

37. Meanwhile, UNMIS has continued to provide assistance to the national and Southern Sudanese authorities on community security and arms control, including civilian disarmament efforts in Pibor County (Jonglei). Those issues pose challenges different from those of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and need additional attention, including an integrated approach by which UNMIS, United Nations partners and local authorities can jointly tackle the intersection between arms control and livelihood issues.

Electoral assistance

38. In late January, the National Constitutional Review Commission confirmed its willingness to engage in a broad consultative process and established two subcommittees to liaise with political parties and other actors at the state level, while a third committee was recently formed to consider submissions from all stakeholders prior to preparing a draft election law. The Commission and the Presidency confirmed that the election bill would be submitted to the National Assembly in 2007, during either the April or October sessions.

39. The Mission continued to actively track legislative developments. Through various workshops, including on women's participation in elections, the Mission's election task force advocated for a fair and enabling environment for the electoral process. UNMIS also supported efforts aimed at legislative reform to promote an appropriate setting for the elections through regular meetings with the Secretary-General of the National Constitutional Review Commission and interaction with the

chairpersons of the specialized committees of the Commission. It also provided an integrated approach and represented the Mission in external mechanisms such as the monthly election donor group meetings and informal parliamentary working group meetings.

Police

40. As at 10 April, UNMIS had deployed its 653 police officers, representing 91 per cent of the Mission's authorized strength.

41. In an attempt to address the pressing need for policing in camps for internally displaced persons, particularly with regard to crimes against women and children, UNMIS initiated a community policing programme, together with Government police at camps for internally displaced persons in Khartoum, Kauda (Southern Kordofan) and Kurmuk (Blue Nile). Training and workshops associated with this project began in March. Meanwhile, UNMIS also established special investigation units in its sector offices in Juba, Wau and Malakal to focus on improving conditions and reviewing the justification for the detention of prisoners in coordination with the Government of Southern Sudan.

42. UNMIS police consolidated and expanded its programme of co-location with the National Police and the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS). The Mission assisted the two services in developing and seeking funding for approved training plans. In Southern Sudan, UNMIS continued the major undertaking of registering SSPS officers, with some 10,464 registered to date. UNMIS also assisted SSPS in identifying an organizational structure and supported the development of a draft Southern Sudan Police Service bill. The training programme and curriculum have been finalized with the leadership of SSPS. Recognizing the need to develop SSPS credibility as an alternative to the military in maintaining law and order, the Government of Southern Sudan Interior Ministry has also requested training in crowd control and maintenance of public order.

Human rights

43. In the area of human rights, the Mission continued its monitoring and capacity-building activities. In particular, with regard to the establishment of a national human rights institution, UNMIS supported broad-based discussions of the draft National Human Rights Commission act, including through a workshop for parliamentarians held on 20 January, and provided technical experts to the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission as it prepared its enabling legislation and programmes.

44. While the members of the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission have been appointed, the enabling law for the Commission has not been finalized. The Government of Southern Sudan needs to enact this important law, make available appropriate financial support and ensure the Commission's independence, in keeping with international standards. It will be important for United Nations agencies, donors and the wider international community to provide additional assistance to help implement the Commission's strategic plan.

45. UNMIS also facilitated workshops for the National Assembly's Human Rights Committee on the reform of laws concerning sexual violence and on parliamentary

cooperation with civil society, and held a series of human rights training sessions for Government police in Khartoum.

Rule of law

46. UNMIS continued to support all parties involved in the development of new legislation related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, especially the Political Parties Act. The Mission organized workshops in Southern Sudan on the role of political parties in the electoral process and on good governance and the rule of law. In Khartoum, the Mission assisted in training organized by the Government of National Unity Ombudsman regarding administration oversight and supported workshops on juvenile justice.

47. UNMIS continued to advocate for corrections reform in the Sudan. In a welcome development, the national Interior Ministry agreed in principle to separate the prison system from the unified police force. In Southern Sudan, UNMIS completed the registration of prison staff in Central Equatoria and Lakes States and organized several training activities. The uncoordinated absorption of SPLA soldiers into the prison service remains a challenge, as do chronic gaps in capacity.

Public information

48. UNMIS radio (Radio Miraya-FM) further expanded its transmission network in an effort to transmit reliable and accessible information about the peace process to a wider audience in the Sudan. The Mission opened a new repeater station in Rumbek in January, and work is set to begin on four additional stations to enable Radio Miraya to broadcast in remote areas of Western and Eastern Equatoria States. In addition to news and Comprehensive Peace Agreement-related programming, some primary educational programmes will begin broadcasting in April. In the absence of an agreement to air in the north, Radio Miraya is negotiating with Khartoum State radio to have it carry some of its programmes.

49. The Mission continued to deliver Comprehensive Peace Agreement workshops and outreach presentations at the community and government levels and to organize visits by journalists from northern Sudan to UNMIS and United Nations agency projects in the south and in transitional areas. UNMIS also continued to cooperate closely with AMIS in the sphere of public information and deployed two public information officers to Darfur under the light support package.

Humanitarian assistance

50. By mid-March, the United Nations workplan for the Sudan, which required $1.8 billion in funding for both humanitarian and recovery assistance in 2007, was 32 per cent funded, with over $580 million pledged. Donors had also pledged some $130 million to the Common Humanitarian Fund. The first tranche of $80 million was allocated to the regions with the most critical needs; Southern Sudan received the largest amount, to support the return of refugees and displaced persons before the onset of the rainy season, followed by Darfur.

51. An outbreak of meningitis reached epidemic levels, spreading to 8 of the 10 states in Southern Sudan as well as to Abyei. Returns of internally displaced persons and refugees were put on hold in several areas, including repatriations from Uganda. A vaccination campaign is ongoing, and the epidemic is now under control. The

World Food Programme assisted 100,000 beneficiaries in Southern Sudan during the month of February. Although the annual needs and livelihoods assessment for Southern Sudan indicates that food security should improve in 2007, the United Nations estimates that 108,000 tons of food aid will still be required by 1.3 million people in the year, 60 per cent of which will be required by the chronically food-insecure households during the April to July "hunger season".

52. The humanitarian situation in Darfur has suffered from persistent violence and overall insecurity. Over 2 million people are now internally displaced, and their numbers continue to rise, while 1.9 million conflict-affected residents remain largely dependent on external aid. Approximately 107,000 civilians were newly displaced by insecurity and fighting between 1 January and 1 April. At the same time, humanitarian access in Darfur continues to be curtailed by a mixture of insecurity, targeted attacks on humanitarian workers and their assets and bureaucratic impediments. On 28 March the Government signed a joint communiqué with the United Nations, which represents a recommitment to the moratorium on restrictions for humanitarian access that entered into force in 2004. It is hoped that this will address the increasing bureaucratic delays experienced by non-governmental organizations working in Darfur. The communiqué also established a high-level committee to ensure proper implementation of the agreement.

53. In recognition of the serious humanitarian challenges in the Sudan, the recently appointed Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, visited the country from 20 to 27 March, travelling to Khartoum, Juba and Government- and rebel-held areas in Darfur, and meeting with Government of National Unity and Government of Southern Sudan officials, humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations, affected populations and tribal leaders.

Protection of civilians

54. In recent months, some progress has been made with regard to the protection of civilians in Southern Sudan, including in Phom al-Zeraf, Tonga, Kaldak and surrounding areas prior to and following the SAF redeployment. However, conflict over land and cattle continues to generate serious protection challenges. UNMIS has verified reports of Murle raids in Jonglei State in which over 150 children were reported to have been abducted since January. During her visit to the Sudan in early February, my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, urged all parties to release children associated with armed groups.

55. UNMIS also identified protection concerns arising from the use of SPLA forces to enforce law and order. The normalization of civilian life and the strengthening of civilian authority were further complicated by insecurity associated with LRA in Equatoria.

Returns

56. The strong cooperation established between the Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan and United Nations agencies began to bear fruit, with the first organized returns of internally displaced persons from Khartoum to Southern Kordofan and Southern Sudan. By mid-April some 20,000 internally displaced persons had been assisted to return to their places of origin in five separate operations, and 25,000 refugees returned home from five neighbouring

countries. While those movements started later than anticipated, they proceeded relatively smoothly. However, the total number of assisted returns are to date short of the target, owing partly to delays in establishing departure facilities in Khartoum, less than expected participation among registered internally displaced persons and delayed financing by the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan.

57. The United Nations continued to monitor the living conditions of internally displaced persons in Khartoum through community-based mechanisms, assessments and dialogue with the relevant authorities. In Darfur, the current situation is not conducive to facilitated returns.

Mine action

58. UNMIS mine action teams have made considerable progress during the current dry season. To date, over 10 million square metres of suspected dangerous areas have been demined, and some 2,700 anti-personnel mines, 1,100 anti-tank mines and 590,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance and small arms ammunition have been cleared. UNMIS and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have provided mine-risk education to over 1 million people in affected areas, as well as in camps and way stations for internally displaced persons, in an attempt to sensitize those returning to the risk of mines and unexploded ordnance. Over 1,300 kilometres of roads have been verified or cleared for emergency deployment and aid delivery, including several return routes.

59. In coordination with UNMIS mine action activities, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) trained five joint integrated demining unit teams, thus achieving the first benchmark for local mine action capacity development in the Sudan.

Recovery and reconstruction

60. The second meeting of the Sudan Consortium was held from 19 to 21 March in Khartoum and Juba. Donors made it clear that they would not be able to continue to finance recovery and development efforts in the north unless there was progress in Darfur, which would have direct implications for support for the "three areas" (Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile). It was recognized at the Sudan Consortium that the Government of Southern Sudan had made significant progress in 2006 in terms of the establishment of institutions at all levels, evidence of more active accountability and expanded capacity-building efforts. However, priorities will need to focus on building public institutions for good governance and establishing basic infrastructure links, enabling productive activities and delivering basic services. Donors also called for a review of aid mechanisms, including the establishment of new priorities and costing for the second phase of the original joint assessment mission.

61. Positive preliminary discussions were held with both the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan on the establishment of "second windows" to the funds administered by UNDP, intended to speed up the disbursement and implementation of early recovery and reintegration initiatives through the multi-donor trust funds.

Gender

62. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and relevant provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, UNMIS provided technical support and capacity-building to the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan ministries responsible for integrating gender perspectives into key legislation. In Khartoum, the Ministry of Social Welfare has submitted for adoption its final draft national gender policy to the Government. UNMIS also continued to support women's organizations seeking to achieve a 30 per cent target for women's representation in the Government of National Unity and a 25 per cent target in the Government of Southern Sudan. Within the Mission, UNMIS promoted gender mainstreaming through training for all staff and the establishment of a system of gender focal points in various Mission components.

HIV/AIDS

63. UNMIS continued to deliver peer HIV/AIDS training, graduating 104 new educators during the period under review, bringing the total to 359. Peer educator training targeted military, youth and women's associations, and the new batch of graduates will support SPLA and the Southern Sudan disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commission. HIV/AIDS sensitization among UNMIS peacekeepers was maintained at 90 per cent. In addition, UNDP, together with other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, continued its efforts to address the HIV/AIDS problem, mainly as part of the Global Fund initiative.

Conduct and discipline

64. Since my previous report, 22 allegations of misconduct have been reported, including two serious cases, which were referred to the Office of Internal Oversight Services for investigation.

65. Following international media reports of alleged sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeepers in Juba, UNMIS leadership re-energized the Mission's effort to enforce the United Nations zero-tolerance policy. In January and February, two workshops were organized with Government and civil society representatives in Khartoum and Juba to explain the prevention and reporting mechanisms as well as the disciplinary action that would be taken against personnel found guilty of misconduct. In the meantime, a task force was established under the National Council for Child Welfare (Khartoum) with UNMIS, UNICEF and other national actors, which will undertake joint preventive and outreach activities. A similar body will be established in Juba with the Government of Southern Sudan.

Mission decentralization

66. As anticipated in the last report, in order to increase the effectiveness of the Mission's operations in Southern Sudan, UNMIS is moving forward with a phased programme of regionalization focusing on a further strengthening of its regional office in Juba. The aim of this process is to enable the office to deliver increased and more efficient support, services and programmes in Southern Sudan and to facilitate local decision-making. The need for this decentralization programme arises first from a series of logistical, administrative and operational challenges faced during the deployment phase in Southern Sudan and second from a growing need for closer daily interaction with the Government of Southern Sudan.

67. The delegation of substantial managerial, administrative and financial authority to the Juba office is well under way. The Mission has created a new post of head of sector 1 (Juba), within existing resources, to enable the Regional Coordinator to coordinate all Mission activities in Southern Sudan, focus on regional issues, represent the Head of Mission on a day-to-day basis with the Government of Southern Sudan and facilitate substantive and managerial oversight of sectors 1, 2 and 3. The Deputy Director of Administration has been relocated to Juba to head a strengthened support component, ensuring that sector offices 1, 2 and 3 are supported directly from the regional office in Juba. Over the next few months, the Mission will expand its office and living accommodation in Juba to cater to the additional staff being assigned there. Similarly, the Mission will continue the process of decentralization throughout its area of responsibility by delegating authority to transitional areas in sectors 4 (Kadugli), 5 (Blue Nile) and 6 (Abyei), as well as to the Darfur office. In Darfur in particular, decentralization will facilitate the deployment of the support packages to AMIS and help prepare the ground for the future deployment of the hybrid mission.

Civilian staffing

68. UNMIS has now substantially overcome its initial difficulty in recruiting and retaining well-qualified personnel. Civilian staff strength rose from 796 to 918 international staff (of a projected total of 1,139 posts), from 2,265 to 2,416 national staff (of a total of 3,342 posts) and 172 to 190 United Nations Volunteers (of a total of 231 posts).

V. Impediments in mandate implementation

69. The challenges described in my previous report persist, with the activities of the Mission hampered by both security constraints and logistical and bureaucratic impediments. The security environment in the Sudan continues to be very complicated, volatile and dependent on a variety of medium- to high-risk internal and external factors. In recent months, the Mission worked hard to enhance the security of its staff and installations through a range of additional and sustainable protective security measures. In Darfur, insecurity remains the major factor limiting the expansion of United Nations operations and support for AMIS. The ceasefire remains tenuous, and armed attacks and looting are on the increase.

70. On 19 January personnel from the United Nations, AMIS and international non-governmental organizations were arrested and detained by national security and local police while attending a gathering at a non-governmental organization guesthouse in Nyala (South Darfur). During the arrest and detention, several individuals, including five United Nations staff members, were physically assaulted with batons and rifles, and a female staff member was subjected to sexual harassment. Upon their release, criminal proceedings were initiated against the United Nations personnel but were later suspended pending review by the Government of National Unity Ministry of Justice. The United Nations has initiated its own board of inquiry to investigate the incident. While the Government had committed itself to cooperating with the United Nations in the investigation, no information has thus far been shared.

71. In the meantime, UNMIS and several agencies continued to face serious obstacles to their operations in Darfur, mainly in North Darfur, where personnel were regularly stopped when travelling, in contravention of the status-of-forces agreement.

72. UNMIS remains very concerned about breaches of the Government's commitments under the status-of-forces agreement. The reporting period saw an increase in interference with United Nations flight operations and customs clearance throughout the Sudan. In high-level meetings, the Government has pledged to address these recurring problems; however, there has not yet been any discernible change.

VI. Financial implications

73. The General Assembly, by its resolution 60/122 B, appropriated the amount of $1,079,534,400, equivalent to $89,961,200 per month, for UNMIS for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMIS beyond 30 April 2007, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2007 would be limited to the amounts approved by the Assembly.

74. As at 31 December 2006, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNMIS amounted to $283 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1.76 million.

75. Troop costs and contingent-owned equipment costs have been reimbursed for the period ending 31 January 2007 and 31 December 2006 respectively.

VII. Observations

76. As the members of the Security Council will recall, my previous report indicated that the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was about to enter a critical phase. The two parties have weathered the first third of the interim period and have continued to make progress against considerable odds, including the untimely death of one of the Agreement's supreme architects, John Garang, continued mistrust and a still considerable number of spoilers. In addition, the ongoing conflict in Darfur remains a source of disagreement between the parties and has diverted the attention of the international community.

77. The implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has reached a delicate stage, at which either the point of departure or the destination could easily be lost. However, two critical reference points bind this middle phase of the interim period, namely, the full and verified redeployment of forces in 2007 and the holding of free and fair midterm elections in 2009. Everything in reason should be done to successfully reach these important markers, which will help the parties to consolidate the gains made thus far and to embark on the final stretch of the peace process.

78. Until now, UNMIS has focused much of its attention and resources on assisting the parties to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as well as on monitoring and observing the ceasefire, with measurable results. Although the parties have yet to agree on a shared strategic approach to security, including the

development of Joint Integrated Units, they have so far acted to manage and de-escalate tensions on the ground. This process of cooperation and problem-solving will need to intensify as the two armed forces approach the larger strategic challenge of complete redeployment.

79. The completion of this vital redeployment process is likely to present several serious challenges in the months ahead. First, the parties must remain firmly committed to the details of the redeployment plans and accept the reality and far-reaching implications of their implementation. This process will require serious political engagement by both parties. Once completed, however, the redeployment will signify a historic end to a three-decade-old pattern of gross military interference and devastating hostilities.

80. With the assistance of the United Nations, the parties must now devote considerable attention to verification of the process. If and when disagreements emerge, they will need to be handled and resolved through the pertinent institutions without jeopardizing overall progress or compromising the integrity of the process. The conclusion of redeployment, which also requires transparency and progress in the integration of other armed groups and the development of Joint Integrated Units, will embody the parties' rejection of a military solution to the conflict that has divided them.

81. Fundamental to meeting all of these challenges is the parties' recognition that the destructive stalemate, which finally led to the momentous compromises reached in Naivasha, Kenya, two and half years ago, remains a lose-lose scenario. The full and irreversible implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is the only viable strategy for the Sudan and its peoples.

82. While the main responsibility for the completion of the security protocol lies with the two parties, they will require the full engagement and support of the international community. In this connection, I urge the Security Council and all concerned Member States to help the Sudanese honour their commitments under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Financial and other assistance from donors will be especially needed in the areas of Joint Integrated Unit development, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programming and community security, based on meaningful security sector reform.

83. The second marker in this phase of the interim period — the preparation for and holding of democratic midterm elections in 2009 — will require equal determination. The elections will be a crucial affirmation of the Naivasha promise to make the Comprehensive Peace Agreement an inclusive process, based on the will of the Sudanese people. The immediate focus of this endeavour should be on the long-overdue enactment of the elections law, to be followed by the prompt establishment of an independent National Election Commission. It is imperative that the National Constitutional Review Commission continue to drive the drafting process for those bills, based on broad and inclusive consultations. Other important prerequisites to effective planning and preparation for elections are an agreement on the boundaries of Abyei and the 1 January 1956 border, the organization of a census and the repatriation of displaced persons.

84. It is equally important to recognize that free and fair elections do not begin at the ballot box; the time has come for tangible progress to be made on lifting restrictions on political opposition and civil society and in bringing the police and

security services in line with the requirements of the Interim National Constitution. In this connection, I regret that the National Human Rights Commission has not yet been established. I urge the Government to do this quickly and in full compliance with the Paris Principles relating to the status of national institutions, as endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 48/134. In particular, I recommend that the composition of the Commission ensure the pluralistic representation of all social forces in civil society that contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights.

85. Support for the electoral process will also require a nimble adjustment of United Nations and international resources, allowing for the rapid build-up of technical assistance and monitoring capacity, as well as intensive engagement with civil society and political actors. In addition to the Government of the Sudan, I urge donors to plan now for the contributions they can make, including for the strengthening of the capacity of political parties, the media and civil society organizations, all of which have important roles to play in the process.

86. In preparing for the elections, the parties must also pay very close attention to the situations in Southern Kordofan, Abyei and Blue Nile and reach understanding on all outstanding issues related to those regions. I trust that the international community will lend its support to such efforts, mindful of the need for the eventual referendum for Abyei and the "popular consultation" for the other two areas, in accordance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

87. Finally, I urge the Sudanese people, and particularly their leaders, to recognize that ultimately, peace in their country is indivisible. Without a resolution to the tragic and devastating conflict in Darfur, continued progress in and eventually a successful conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will be hard to achieve. While troop redeployments can proceed without immediate impact on the situation in Darfur, the same is not true for the country-wide preparations necessary for successful midterm elections in 2009. Peace and stability throughout the country remain a fundamental requirement for elections. As the Security Council considers the future of the Sudan, I urge members to pursue an integrated approach in which an international strategy for peace in Darfur is reinforcing the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The paramount goal for international complementary efforts in the areas of security, political and humanitarian assistance must be to stabilize Darfur sufficiently so that its residents are able to participate in the 2009 midterm elections along with the rest of the country.

88. Peace in the Sudan will also require sustained attention to post-conflict recovery and development. Again, there can be little progress in the north, including the three areas, without an improvement in the situation in Darfur. In addition to supporting peace throughout the Sudan, donors will need to continue to meet the pledges they made at Oslo and prepare for additional commitments in 2008 and beyond to support the second phase of the joint assessment mission. Seeing those commitments through will be critical to realizing the joint pledge made at the meeting of the Sudan Consortium to make 2007 the year for the delivery of peace dividends.

89. For its part, the United Nations will do its utmost to contribute to the cause of peace throughout the Sudan, including through its full support to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Darfur Peace Agreement and other

major decisions. In this connection, I would like to recommend that the mandate of UNMIS be extended for six months, until 31 October 2007.

90. In conclusion, I wish to express my gratitude to all United Nations personnel working in the Sudan for their determined effort to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to end the conflict in Darfur. I am also very appreciative of the efforts of the African Union — with whom the United Nations is cooperating very closely — as well as the invaluable assistance provided by Member States, including donors and troop- and police-contributing countries.

Annex

Military and police component as at 10 April 2007

	Military component									
	Observers		*Staff officers*		*Troops*		*Military subtotal*		*Civilian police*	
Country	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
Argentina	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	—
Australia	5	1	5	4	—	—	10	5	9	1
Bangladesh	20	—	31	—	1 503	—	1 554	—	27	—
Belgium	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—
Benin	7	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—
Bolivia	15	—	1	—	—	—	16	—	—	—
Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Botswana	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—
Brazil	24	—	—	—	—	—	24	—	3	—
Cambodia	10	—	1	—	134	—	145	—	—	—
Canada	23	—	7	—	—	—	30	1	1	1
China	14	—	11	—	424	11	449	11	7	2
Croatia	—	—	5	—	—	—	5	—	—	—
Denmark	10	—	6	—	—	—	16	—	2	—
Ecuador	20	—	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	—
Egypt	20	—	21	—	781	15	822	15	2	—
El Savador	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	4	2
Fiji	7	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	4	3
Finland	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	2	—
Gabon	6	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
Gambia	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	4	—
Germany	33	—	5	—	—	—	38	—	5	—
Ghana	—	—	3	—	—	—	3	—	35	3
Greece	4	—	2	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
Guatemala	8	—	1	—	—	—	9	—	—	—
Guinea	10	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	—
India	20	—	27	—	2 577	4	2 624	4	20	2
Indonesia	10	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	—
Jamaica	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	2
Jordan	12	—	9	—	—	—	21	—	23	2
Kenya	6	1	10	—	776	32	795	33	18	2
Kyrgyzstan	5	3	—	—	—	—	5	3	2	—
Malawi	6	—	1	—	—	—	7	—	—	—
Malaysia	8	—	3	—	—	—	11	—	11	—
Mali	9	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	—
Moldova	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Mongolia	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Mozambique	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Namibia	9	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	1	—
Nepal	6	2	6	—	—	—	12	2	55	2
Netherlands	14	—	3	—	—	—	17	—	14	1

	Military component									
	Observers		*Staff officers*		*Troops*		*Military subtotal*		*Civilian police*	
Country	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
New Zealand	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	—
Nigeria	10	—	5	1	—	—	15	1	29	2
Norway	16	—	11	—	—	—	27	—	4	—
Pakistan	20	—	26	—	1 538	—	1 584	—	36	2
Paraguay	10	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	—
Peru	17	—	—	—	—	—	17	—	—	—
Philippines	13	—	—	—	—	—	13	—	52	—
Poland	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Republic of Korea	7	—	1	—	—	—	8	—	—	—
Romania	12	—	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	—
Russian Federation	15	—	3	—	120	—	138	—	11	—
Rwanda	15	—	8	—	254	—	277	—	24	—
Samoa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16	—
South Africa	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	—	—
Sri Lanka	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	22	1
Sweden	3	—	1	—	—	—	4	—	13	2
Thailand	12	—	1	—	—	—	13	—	—	—
Turkey	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	27	—
Uganda	9	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	17	3
Ukraine	4	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	23	—
United Kingdom	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	2	—
United Republic of Tanzania	15	—	2	—	—	—	17	—	2	—
United States	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	2
Uruguay	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Vanuatu	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
Yemen	16	—	3	—	—	—	19	—	3	—
Zambia	10	2	11	—	306	39	327	41	21	1
Zimbabwe	12	2	2	—	—	—	14	2	22	11
Total per gender	**584**	**11**	**248**	**5**	**8 414**	**101**	**9 246**	**117**	**606**	**47**
Total	**595**		**253**		**8 515**		**9 363**		**653**	



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